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1) The basic question: can we get to causality via Bayes nets? 
 
Probability is a guide to life partly because it is a guide to causality. Work over the last two 
decades using Bayes nets supposes that probability is a very sure guide to causality. I think not, 
and I shall argue that here. Almost all the objections I list are well-known. But I have come to see 
them in a different light by reflecting again on the original work in this area by Wolfgang Spohn 
and his recent defense of it in a paper titled “Bayesian Nets Are All There Is To Causality”.1  
 
Bayes nets are directed acyclic graphs that represent probabilistic independencies among an 
ordered set of variables. The parents of a variable X are the minimal set of predecessors that 
render X independent of all its other predecessors. If the variables are temporally ordered, we can 
read the very same graph as a graph of the (generic-level) causal relations among the quantities 
represented, it is maintained. This commits us to the causal Markov condition described below, 
which is a relative of Reichenbach’s claim that conditioning on common causes will render joint 
effects independent of one another. It is also usual to add an assumption called faithfulness or 
stability as well as to assume that all underlying systems of causal laws are deterministic (plus the 
causal minimality condition, which I will not discuss). With these assumptions in hand there are a 
variety of algorithms for inferring causal relations from independencies. These I will loosely call 
“Bayes nets methods”.   
 
In criticizing the inference to causes from Bayes nets it is usual to list the objections I note. Is this 
just an arbitrary list? And why should one have expected any connection between the two to 
begin with? After all, Bayes nets encode information about probabilistic independencies. 
Causality, if it has any connection with probability, would seem to be related to probabilistic 
dependence.  
 
The answers to the two questions are related. When we see why there might be a connection 
between causality and independence, we see why there will be a list of objections. The answer to 
“why” is not one that will sound surprising, but I want to focus on it because working through the 
argument will show that we have been looking at probability and causality in the wrong way. 
Probabilities may be a guide to causes, but they are, I shall argue, like symptoms of a disease: 
there is no general formula to get from the symptom to the disease.    
 
 
2) The call for explanation. 
 
It is usual to suppose that once the right set of assumptions are made about the causal systems 
under study, we can read information about causes from a Bayes net that satisfies those 
assumptions. Wolfgang Spohn maintains that if there is a tight connection like this between Bayes 
nets and an independent notion of causation, there should be a general reason for this. He cannot 
                                                 
1 Spohn forthcoming.  
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find one; so he proposes that the notion of causation at stake is not independent. The probabilistic 
patterns of a Bayes net is our concept of causation: “It is the structure of suitably refined Bayesian 
nets which decides about how the causal dependencies run.”2  
 
I agree with Spohn that if there is a tight connection, there should be a reason for it. The 
alternative is what Gerd Buchdahl called a  ”brute force” connection, one which holds in nature 
but has no “deeper” explanation. There are such brute force connections between concepts we use 
in science.  These are what we record in fundamental laws. And some of them involve relational 
concepts like “…causes…” For instance, if the allowed energy configuration for a system in 
relation to its environment is represented by a specific Hamiltonian, say H, then whatever the 
system’s current state (say Φ), the system will evolve in time according to –i/h ∂Φ/∂t = HΦ.  
 
But I do not think there is a brute force connection in the case of Bayes nets and causation.  That 
is primarily because there is a reason for the connection, a good reason. The problem is that the 
reason does not justify a tight connection. The reason lets us see why the connection will hold 
when it does, but it also allows us to see how loose the connection between the two is. For 
simplicity I will stick to yes-no causes and effects in the subsequent discussion. We are looking 
for an equivalence between causal connections and Bayes nets. I will start with causation and see 
first how – and when – we can get from causation to the probability relations pictured in Bayes 
nets. 
 
 
3. From causation to probabilistic dependence. 
 
3a. Where have all the caveats gone? 
 
Causes produce their effects; they make them happen.3 So, in the right kind of population we can 
expect that there will be a higher frequency of the effect (E) when the cause (C) is present than 
when it is absent; and conversely for preventatives.  What kind of populations are “the right 
kinds”? Populations in which the requisite causal process  sometimes operates unimpeded and its 
doing so is not correlated with other processes that mask the increase in probability, such as the 
presence of a process preventing the effect or the absence of another positive process.  
 
Here are some of the conditions that we know need to be satisfied: the necessary triggering and 
helping causes for C must operate together sometimes in the population, and their joint operation 
should not be probabilistically dependent on that of other causes or preventatives, nor of C itself.  
Nor is the operation of C to produce E probabilistically dependent on the operation of other 
causes or preventatives of E. 
 
The trouble with Bayes nets is that they ignore all these caveats. When Bayes nets are used as 
causal graphs, effects are probabilistically dependent upon each of their causes. That’s it. Nothing 
can mask this. The assumptions about causality made by the Bayes net approach go all the way 
                                                 
2 Spohn forthcoming, p. 10. 
3 When we deal with quantities of more than two values, there are other possibilities; e.g., a cause may raise 
the level of the effect. 
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back to the first, then ground-breaking, probabilistic analysis of causality by Patrick Suppes.4  
Suppes begins with prima facie causation: any earlier factor that is correlated with an effect is a 
prima facie cause of that effect. Real causes are ones that survive the same independence tests 
that are required in the Bayes net. But nothing gets to be a candidate for a cause unless it is 
correlated with the putative effect.  
 
Twenty to thirty years later we have the Bayes net approach, in all essentials equivalent to the 
original formulation proposed by Suppes when the subject first began. It is as if Simpson’s 
paradox and causal decision theory never existed. Nor decades of practice by econometricians and 
other social scientists, who plot not simple regressions but partial regressions. Nor the widely 
deployed definition proposed by Granger in 1969, which looks for probabilistic dependence only 
after conditioning on the entire past history of the cause – which ensures that  all the other causes 
up to the time of the putative cause will be held fixed. 
 
The demand that effects always be probabilistically dependent on each cause follows in the Bayes 
net approach from the assumption that Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour and Richard Scheines call 
faithfulness.5 Judea Pearl calls it stability.6 The assumption is necessary to the approach. Without 
it the procedures developed by Pearl and by Spirtes, et. al. cannot get very far with the discovery 
of causal connections; and the proofs that assure us that they will not make mistakes if sample 
sizes are large enough will not go through.  For Spohn it matters because he argues that causal 
connections are the connections marked out on God’s big Bayes net once the variables have been 
temporally ordered. With the faithfulness/stability assumption, the causal connections are unique; 
but they are seldom unique otherwise.  
 
For those readers who are not already deeply into this discussion let me rehearse the standard 
objections to the assumption that all genuine causes are prima facie causes. First there is 
Simpson’s Paradox: facts about probabilistic dependency can be reversed in moving from 
populations to subpopulations. For example, factor X may be positively dependent or negatively 
dependent or independent of Y in a population but be still be any of these three in all partitions of 
the population along the values of a third factor Z if Z is itself probabilistically dependent on X 
and Y. Z may for instance be a preventative of Y; because of its correlation with X, the presence 
of X does not after all increase the frequency of Y’s in the population as my opening argument 
suggests. 
 
It is typical in social science to sidestep this problem by looking for probabilistic dependence 
between a putative cause and its effect only in subpopulations in which all possible confounding 
factors are held fixed. This is apparent in the econometrics concept of Granger causality, where X 
Granger causes Y if X and Y are probabilistically dependant holding fixed everything that has 
occurred up to the time of the putative cause.   
 
The same strategy was at the heart of various versions of causal decision theory two decades ago. 
What is the probability that if I were to do C, E would occur? The conditional probability P(E/C) 
gives the wrong answer. It could be either way too big or way to small because of the operation of 
                                                 
4 Suppes 1970. 
5 Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993. 
6 Pearl 1999. 
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confounding factors; relevant here – it could be zero even though my doing C could have a 
substantial impact on whether E occurs. One standard proposal (the one I urged7) is to set P(C 
 → E) = P(E/C&K), where K is a state description over the values of a full set of “other” causal 
factors for E that obtain (or will obtain) in the decision situation.8 Where we do not know the 
values of the factors in K we should average over all possible values using our best estimate of 
the probability that they will occur: ΣP(E/C&Kj)P(Kj). 
 
Exactly the same formula has reappeared among the Bayes nets causal theorists. Judea Pearl has 
recently produced a very fine and detailed account of counterfactuals and their probabilities, 
based on Bayes nets. According to Pearl, the probability of y if we were to “set” X = xj is ΣP(y/xj   
& parents of xj)P(parents of xj)9.  Despite Pearl’s endorsement of stability, from this formula it 
looks as if a factor can have a high degree of causal efficacy even though on his account it is not 
really a cause at all because it is not prima facie a cause. I take it that Pearl does not take this to 
be a problem because he thinks cases where “stability” is violated involve “’pathological’ 
parameterizations”10 and are not in the range he will address. 
 
The second kind of case usually cited in which genuine causes are not prima facie causes is when 
one and the same cause has different kinds of influence on the effect. The different influences 
may cancel each other. The easiest version of this to handle is when a given factor acts as both 
cause and preventative of the effect, by different routes. G. Hesslow’s birthcontrol pills11 are the 
canonical philosophical example. The pills are a positive cause of thrombosis. On the other hand, 
they prevent pregnancy, which is itself a cause of thrombosis. Given the right weights for the 
three processes, the net effect of the pills on the frequency of thrombosis can be zero. 
 
If we suspect that cancellations of this kind are occurring, we can confirm our suspicions by 
looking at the probabilities of thrombosis given the pills in populations in which factors from the 
separate causal routes between pills and thrombosis are held fixed. But this is no comfort to the 
Bayes nets theorist. 
 
Even this strategy is not available where there are no routes between the cause and its effects. We 
have two kinds of trouble with routes. The first is a worry that I share with Glenn Shafer.12 Let us 
accept that in every case of singular causation there is a temporally continuous process connecting 
the cause with the effect. That does not guarantee that there will always be a vertex between any 
two other vertices in God’s great causal graph. That is because the graph’s are graphs of causal 
laws that hold between event-types. Every token of the cause-type may in actuality be connected 
by a continuous process with the effect token without there being some chain of laws in between: 
C1 causes C2, …, Cn causes E. For instance, the signal from the cause to the effect may piggyback 
                                                 
7 Cartwright 1983, “Causal laws and effective strategies”. 
8 What counts as a complete set of factors is not so easy to characterize for probabilistic causality. (For one 
definition, see Cartwright 1989, p. 112.)  The task is easy if we are allowed to help ourselves to the notion 
of  the objective system of causal laws governing a population, as Pearl and Spohn and I do (see 
Cartwright, forthcoming). In that case K ranges over all the parents of E,  barring C, relative to God’s great 
causal graph for the population. 
9 Pearl 2000, p. 73. 
10 Pearl 2000, p.48. 
11 Hesslow 1976. 
12 Shafer 1996. 
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on causal processes that the cause in question does not initiate. This is particularly likely where 
there are a lot of processes with the necessary spatio-temporal relations already available for use 
in conveying the influence from the cause to the effect.13 
 
The other is a problem we all sweep under the rug: the representations in a causal graph are 
discrete; for every vertex there is always a predecessor and a successor. Is causality really like 
that? If it is then we can have cases of causes with mixed influences on the effect, directly, not by 
different routes. So the device of holding fixed vertices along the various routes is not even 
available to provide us with a way of using facts about probabilistic dependencies and 
independencies to test whether a factor is really causally inefficacious rather than having mixed 
influence on the effect. 
 
2b.Can the caveats be ignored? 
 
What justification do Bayes nets theorists give for ignoring all these caveats and insisting that all 
causes must appear as causes at the first crude look? Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines discuss 
Simpson’s paradox at length. They present two graphs, the first embodying Simpson’s paradox; 
the second is a graph that by contrast is “faithful” to all the independencies assumed in the 
paradoxical case – i.e., as in Suppes original formulation, all causes are prima facie causes:14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUT HERE GRAPHS (i) and (ii)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They then invite us to 
 
[s]uppose for a moment that we ignore the interpretation that Simpson gave to the 
variables in his example…Were we to find A and C are independent but dependent 
conditional on B, the Faithfulness Condition requires that if any causal structure obtains, it 
is structure (ii). Still, structure (i) is logically possible15, and if the variables had the 
significance Simpson gives them we would of course prefer it. But if prior knowledge 
does not require structure (i), what do we lose by applying the Faithfulness Condition; 
                                                 
13 For further discussion, see Cartwright l999, chs. 5 and 7. 
14 Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines l993, p. 68. 
15 I suppose they mean by “logically” possible that it is consistent with the other assumptions they wish to 
make about causal laws and probabilities. 
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what, in other words, do we lose by excluding causal structures that are not faithful to the 
distribution [i.e., that allow genuine causes that do not appear as causes prima facie]?16 
 
I assume that this passage is meant as a defense of the faithfulness condition since it appears at 
the end of the long exposition of Simpson’s paradox in the section in which they introduce 
faithfulness as an axiom17 and just before the only other remark that could be construed as a 
defense of this axiom in the face of Simpson’s paradox. But what is the defense? The answer to 
their question is obviously: what we lose is getting the causal structure right.  
 
Perhaps they mean to suggest that when we do not know anything, it is more reasonable to plump 
for structure (ii) than for structure (i). But what is the argument for that? I respond with a truism: 
when you don’t know, you don’t know; and it is often dangerous to speculate. If we have no idea 
what the variables stand for, let alone how they operate, we are not in a position to make a bet 
with any degree of credibility. “Ah yes,” I am sometimes told, “but what if you had to bet?” Well, 
tell me more about the context in which I am forced to bet – a psychological experiment perhaps? 
–  and I may be able to tell you which bet I would plump for. 
 
Perhaps, however, Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines are speaking sloppily. They did no mean “what 
do we lose?” but rather “how often will we lose?” For immediately after this they report that “[i]n 
the linear case, the parameter values – values of the linear coefficients and exogenous variances of 
a structure – form a real space, and the set of points in this space that create vanishing partial 
correlations not implied by the Markov condition [i.e., that violate faithfulness] have Lebesgue 
measure zero.”18  
 
This is surely intended as an argument in favour of faithfulness – and it is frequently cited as 
being so intended – though I am not sure exactly what the conclusion is that it is supposed to 
support. I gather we are to conclude that it is unlikely that any causal system to which we consider 
applying our probabilistic methods will involve genuine causes that are not prima facie causes as 
well.  
 
But this conclusion would follow only if there were some plausible way to connect a Lebesgue 
measure over a space of ordered n-tuples of real numbers with the way in which parameters are 
chosen or arise naturally for the causal systems that we will be studying. I have never seen such a 
connection proposed; that I think is because there is no possible plausible story to be told. 
Moreover, were some connection mooted, we should keep in mind that it could not bear directly 
on the question of how any actual parameter value is chosen because, as we all know, any specific 
point in the space will have measure zero. So we not only need a story that connects a Lebesgue 
measure over a space of n-tuples of real numbers with how real parameter values arise, but we 
need a method that selects as a question to be addressed before values are chosen: shall values 
occur that satisfy faithfulness or not? 
 
                                                 
16 Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines l993, pp. 67-8. 
17 In fact this is not literally true since the section, though headed “Axioms” only introduces a definition of 
faithfulness and does not make any claims about it. It is clear from the various sales pitches they make for 
their methods, however, that they take it to be a condition true of  almost all causal systems. 
18 Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993, p. 68. 
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Not only is the theorem about Lebesgue measure not relevant to the issue of whether all causes 
are prima facie causes. I think it is an irresponsible interjection into the discussion. Getting it right 
about the causal structure of a real system in front of us is often a matter of great importance. It is 
not appropriate to offer the authority of formalism over serious consideration of what are the best 
assumptions to make about the structure at hand. 
 
Judea Pearl argues somewhat differently about the choice of parameter values. He uses the term 
stability for the condition that insists that effects be probabilistically dependent on their causes 
even before confounding factors are conditioned on. Here is what he says in its entirety: 
 
Some structures may admit peculiar parameterizations that would render them 
indistinguishable from many other  minimal models that have totally disparate structures. 
For example, consider a binary variable C that takes the value 1 whenever the outcomes of 
two fair coins (A and B) are the same and takes the value 0 otherwise. In the trivariate 
distribution generated by this parameterization, each pair of variables is marginally 
independent yet is dependent conditioning on the third variable.  Such a dependence 
pattern may in fact be generated by three minimal causal structures, each depicting one of 
the variables as causally dependent on the other two, but there is now way to decide 
among the three.  In order to rule out such “pathological” parameterizations, we impose a 
restriction on the distribution called stability…This restriction conveys the assumption 
that all the independencies imbedded in [the probability distribution] P are stable; that is, 
they are implied by the structure of the model D and hence remain invariant to any 
changes in the parameters [of D]. In our example only the correct structure (namely, A → 
C ← B) will retain its independence pattern in the face of changing parameterizations – 
say, when one of the coins becomes slightly biased.19 
 
We can see here two points of view that Pearl takes that make stability seem plausible to him. 
First, Pearl thinks causal systems should be decidable. It is clearly a criticism of the systems 
described that “there is no way to decide among the three”. This attitude is revealed in discussions 
of other topics as well. For instance, as we shall see below, I reject the causal Markov condition. 
Pearl objects that by so doing I make questions about the causal structure and about the truth of 
certain counterfactuals unanswerable.20  
 
Unanswerable given what information? Immediately after the section defining “stability” Pearl 
tells us, “With the added assumption of stability, every distribution has a unique minimal causal 
structure…, as long as there are no hidden variables.”21 Clearly he intends that the questions he is 
concerned about should be answerable given an order for the full set of causally relevant variables 
and the probability distribution over them. But so far as I can see, once we have given up the idea 
that there is something wrong with the notion of cause so that it has to be reduced away, there is 
no good reason to suppose that probabilities should be able to answer all questions about causality 
for us. (Nor am I sure that Pearl insists they should; for it is unclear whether he thinks all causal 
systems are stable, or takes the more modest line that his methods are capable of providing 
answers to all his questions only for systems that are stable.) 
                                                 
19 Pearl 2000, p. 48. 
20 UCSD Philosophy of Economics Seminar, May 1999. 
21 Pearl 2000, p. 49. 
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The other point of view that matters for Pearl’s claims about stability is the point of view of the 
engineer – which he is. It is apparent from the passage that Pearl thinks of causal structures as in 
some sense coming first: they get fixed, but then the parameter values can vary. But of course a 
causal system comes with both its structure and it parameters – you can’t have one without the 
other.  
 
I think the way to put the issue that makes sense of the idea of “structure first” is in terms of the 
kinds of operation we typically perform on the kinds of engineered devices Pearl generally has in 
mind. Think of a toaster. Its parts and their arrangement are fixed. We may bend the position of 
the trip plate a little, or of the expanding metal strip which it will meet, in order to keep the 
brownness of the toast calibrated with the settings on the brownness control. The values of the 
parameters do not matter so long as the basic causal structure does not break down; indeed the 
values are just the kind of thing we expect to drift over time. But we would have a legitimate 
cause of complaint if the same were true of the structure within the first year we owned the 
toaster. 
 
That is fine for a toaster. But for other situations the parameters may matter equally with the 
structure, or more so.  If birthcontrol pills do cause thrombosis we may work very hard to weaken 
the strength with which they do so at least to the point where people who take the pills are no 
worse off than those who do not. Indeed we may take this as an important aim – we are more 
obliged to get the effects to cancel out than we are to continue to spend money and research time 
to reduce the risk of thrombosis among pill takers below that of non-pilltakers. Getting the 
cancellation that stability/faithfulness prohibits is important to us. 
 
This brings us to what seems to me a real oddity in the whole idea of stability/faithfulness. 
Probabilities and causal structures constrain each other. If the probability is fixed, then nature – 
and we – are not allowed to build certain kinds of causal structures. For instance, if we have the 
three binary variables, A,B and C, as in Pearl’s example, with a probability in which they are 
pairwise independent and have to create a causal arrangement (or lack of!) among the three, we 
are prevented from building just the one Pearl describes. Or to think of it with causal structure 
first, as Pearl generally seems to, if C is to take value 1 or 0 depending on whether the outcome of 
the flip of two coins is the same or not, we are prevented from using fair coins and must introduce 
at least a little bias. 
 
I come finally to the question of  whether we should in fact expect to see a lot of causes that are 
not causes prima facie. A good many of the systems to which we think of applying the methods 
advocated by Bayes nets theorists are constructed systems. Either highly designed, like a toaster 
or an army admissions test, or a mix of intentional design, historical influence and unintended  
consequences, as in various socio-economic examples. In these cases cancellation of the effects of 
a given cause, either by encouraging the action of other factors or by encouraging the contrary 
operation of the cause itself, can be an important aim, particularly where the effect is deleterious. 
It will often be a lot easier to design for, or encourage the emergence of, cancellation  than it is to 
eliminate the cause of the unwanted effect, or less costly or more overall beneficial (as in my 
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discussion of birthcontrol pills). There is no good reason to assume that our aims are almost 
always frustrated.22 
 
This is a view that Kevin Hoover also stresses in his work on causality in macroeconomics. He 
considers a macroeconomic example in which “agency can result in constraints appearing in the 
data that [violate faithfulness].”23 He concludes 
 
Spirtes et al. … acknowledge the possibility that particular parameter values might result 
in violations of faithfulness, but they dismiss their importance as having “measure zero”. 
But this will not do for macroecomics. It fails to account for the fact that in macroecomic 
and other control contexts, the policymaker aims to set parameter values in just such a 
way as to make this supposedly measure-zero situation occur. To the degree that policy is 
successful, such situations are common, not infinitely rare.24 
 
Perhaps, however, the issue will be made: can we ever really expect exact cancellation? After all, 
to get an arrow in a Bayes net causal graph, any degree of dependence between cause and effect 
will do. After we have the arrow in, we need not be misled by the smallness of the dependence to 
think the influence is small. For we can then insist on measuring degree of efficacy by the 
formula above that I and other causal decision theorists proposed and that Pearl endorses for P(C 
 → E). 
 
One reason we may think exact cancellations are rare is that actually getting any really precise 
value we aim for is rare. In a recent discussion of instrumentalism, Elliott Sober25 talks about a 
comparison of the heights of corn plants in two populations. One thing we know, he claims, is 
that they are not really equal. Still, that is the working hypothesis. I take it one of the reasons he 
thinks we know this is that "exactly equal"  is very precise; and any very precise prediction is very 
likely to be wrong in an imprecise discipline. 
 
This raises some very difficult issues about modelling and reality, especially for probabilities. We 
design a device to set the difference between two quantities at zero; tests for quality control show 
that, within bounds of experimental error, we succeeded; and we model the difference as zero. 
Should we think it “really” is zero? It is not certain the question makes sense, even when we are 
thinking of, say, a difference between the length of two strips in a single designated device.  It 
becomes particularly problematic when we are thinking about a difference of two probabilities in 
a population.  Is the increase in probability of thrombosis on taking birthcontrol pills exactly 
offset by the decrease via pregnancy prevention in British women between the ages of 20 and 35 
in the period from 1980 to 1990? All the conventional issues about what we intend by talking 
about the true probability become especially acute here. 
 
Some, I think, we can sidestep, particularly when we are thinking about the application of the 
Bayes nets approach to causality as opposed to the philosophical issue about substitutability 
raised by Spohn. For we are going to be using these methods in doing real social, medical and 
                                                 
22 For further discussion see Cartwright 1999, ch. 2, and 2000. 
23 Hoover forthcoming, p. 7-33.  
24 Hoover forthcoming, p. 7-35. 
25 Sober 1999. 
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engineering science, using real data.26 And here it is not unusual for our best estimates from the 
data to render two quantities probabilistically independent where estimates of  appropriate partial 
conditional probabilities – as well perhaps as our background knowledge or even other kinds of 
tests we have conducted for the relevant causal connections –  suggest the result is due to 
cancellation. In this case we either have to insist the probabilities are not those our best estimates 
indicate or forsake the commitment to faithfulness. 
 
Before leaving this section I should repeat an old point, for completeness. Sometimes it is argued 
that Bayes nets methods should supplement what we know. So if we do have independent 
evidence of cancellation, we should use it and not insist on faithfulness. But where we do not 
have such information we should assume faithfulness. As I indicated earlier, this strategy is ill-
founded; indeed, I think irresponsible. Where we don’t know, we don’t know. When we have to 
proceed with little information we should make the best evaluation we can for the case at hand – 
and hedge our bets heavily; we should not proceed with false confidence having plumped either 
for or against some specific hypothesis – like faithfulness – for how the given system works when 
we really have no idea.  
 
 
4. From probabilistic dependence to causality. 
 
If we have a hypothesis that C causes E, we can use what we have just reviewed to test it, via the 
hypothetico-deductive method. But that is a method that we know to be more accurate at rejecting 
hypotheses than confirming them. Bayes nets methods promise more: they will bootstrap from 
facts about dependencies and independencies to causal hypotheses – and, claim the advocates, 
never get it wrong.  
 
Again, as Spohn argues, if there really is this tight connection, there ought to be an argument for 
why it obtains. And there is. Again, we can see from looking at the argument why the inference 
from dependencies and independencies sometimes works, and why it will not work all the time. 
As with the other direction of inference, there is an argument for the connection and the argument 
itself makes clear that the connection is not tight. 
 
What kinds of circumstances can be responsible for a probabilistic dependence between A and B? 
Lots of things. The fact that A causes B is among them: Causes produce their effects; they make 
them happen. So, in the right kind of population we can expect that there will be a higher 
frequency of the effect (E) when the cause (C) is present than when it is absent; and conversely 
for preventatives. With caveats. 
 
What else? Here are a number of things, all discussed in the literature: 1)A and B may have a 
common cause or a common preventative or correlated causes or correlated preventatives, where 
either the causes are deterministic or the action of producing A occurs independently of the action 
producing B. 2) A and B may cooperate to produce an effect. In populations where the effect is 
                                                 
26 For an example of an attempt to use the Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines methods on real economic data in 
economics, see Swanson and Grangr 1997. Their struggles there are particularly relevant to my point in this 
paragraph because they consider various alternatives choices among the lowest partial correlations to 
suppose are “really” zero. 
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either heavily present or heavily absent, A and B may be dependent on each other. 3) When two 
populations governed by different systems of causal laws or exhibiting different probability 
distributions are mixed together, the resulting population may not satisfy the causal Markov 
condition even though each of the subpopulations do. (This is analogous to Simpson’s paradox 
reversals.) 4) A and B may be quantities with the same kind of temporal evolution, both 
monotonically increasing, say. Then the value of A at t will be probabilistically dependent on the 
value of B at t. 5)A and B may be produced as product and by-product from a probabilistic cause. 
 
Let us look at each in turn and at what the defenders of Bayes nets have to say about them. I begin 
with 1) which is the case that advocates of Bayes nets methods acknowledge and try to deal with 
squarely – assuming the underlying system is deterministic. 
 
 
3a) Why factors may be dependent: 1)Common causes (where nature is deterministic). 
 
Following Judea Pearl,27 let us call the total effect of all those causes of X that are omitted from V 
and which combine with the direct causes in V of X to form a set of causes sufficient to fix the 
value of X, a random disturbance factor for X.28 Bayes net methods are applied only to special 
sets of variables: sets V such that for each X in V, the random disturbance factor for X is 
probabilistically independent of that for every other variable in V. In such a variable set we can 
prove that the causal Markov condition will be satisfied.29  
 
The causal Markov condition, along with the assumption that all causes are prima facie causes, 
lies at the heart of the Bayes net methods. It tells us that a variable will be probabilistically 
independent of every other variable except its own effects once all of its direct cause have been 
conditioned on. So we eliminate cases where a dependence between A and B is due to reason 1) 
by requiring that the dependence persist once we have conditioned on the parents of A.   
 
Everyone acknowledges that some constraint like this is necessary. You cannot get from 
dependence to causation; you at least have to first hold fixed the causal parents or something 
equivalent, then look for dependence. So in the remaining sections when I talk about the route 
from dependence to causation, I mean dependence conditional on a set of causal parents. To claim 
that this is enough to ensure a causal connection is to maintain the causal Markov condition. 
 
My description of the restriction on the variable set V is rather long-winded. The first reason is to 
avoid a small problem of characterization. What I have called “random disturbance factors” are 
sometimes called “exogenous” factors. There are various concepts of exogeneity. This usage 
obviously refers to the one in which exogenous factors are not caused by any variables in the 
system. Pearl clearly assumes that is true of random disturbance factors. But the proof requires 
more, for it is possible for all exogenous causes of one variable to be independent of those for 
another without the disturbance terms themselves being independent. That’s because it is  
possible for a function of X and Y to be dependent on Z even if the three factors are pairwise 
                                                 
27 Pearl 2000, p.44. 
28 These are often designated ux when variables in V are designated x,y,…. 
29 Cf. Verma and Pearl, 1991 or Pearl, 2000, p. 30.  
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independent. So it is not enough that the exogenous causes for a variable be independent of those 
for other variables: the proof needs their net effects to be independent.    
 
The second reason is that some of the other terminology used in the discussion is unclear. Often 
we are told, as by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines,30 that the methods will be applied only to sets 
that are causally sufficient, adding the bold assumption that as a matter of empirical fact, this will 
ensure the necessary independencies among the disturbance factors. But what is causal 
sufficiency? Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines tell us, “We require for causal sufficiency of V for a 
population that if X is not in V and is a common cause of two or more variables in V, that the 
joint probability of all variables in V be the same on each value of X that occurs in the 
population.”31  
 
Let us assume that C is a common cause of A and B if C is a cause of A and a cause of B. The 
problem then is that this definition is too demanding. Every cause of a common cause is itself a 
common cause. These could go back in time ad infinitum. And for any system for which there is a 
temporally continuous process connecting a cause with an effect at the type-level, between each 
common cause and an earlier one there will be infinitely more. If we apply the methods only to 
variable sets that get them all in, we will not apply them at all. What we want to get in are all the 
last ones – the ones as close to both effects as possible.32 But it will take some effort to formulate 
that properly. Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines are particularly hampered here because they restrict 
their definitions to facts about causally correct representations rather than talking about causal 
relations in the world. 
 
Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines avoid this problem by offering a different characterization. They 
define, “We say that a variable X is a common cause of variables Y and Z if and only if X is a 
direct cause of Y relative to {X,Y,Z} and a direct cause of Z relative to {X,Y,Z}.”33 And for 
direct cause: “C is a direct cause of A relative to V just in case C is a member of some set C 
included in V/{A} such that (i) the events in C are causes of A, (ii) the events in C, were they to 
occur, would cause A no matter whether the events in V/({A}∪C} were or were not to occur, and 
(iii) no proper subset of C satisfies (i) and (ii).”34 
 
The variables in V are seldom sufficient to fix the value of an effect. So how can fixing whether 
the events in C occur or not ensure that A occurs? So let us add into the set C the random 
disturbance factor for A. But in fact, it looks as if we have to assume as fixed all exogenous 
causes, or at least the “last” one if that makes sense, since it will not help to fix one but allow 
temporally subsequent ones to vary. We also need to add that quantities occurring between C and 
A in nature’s objective graph must be assumed to take on the values dictated by C. And so forth. 
 
I do not know how to formulate all this correctly. But it needs to be done if the notion of causal 
sufficiency is to be used. Quite reasonably the advertisements for Bayes nets methods make much 
                                                 
30 Cf . Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993, p. 54. 
31 1993, p.45. 
32 Note that where A c? B and B c?C and B c?D, if  C and D are independent conditioning on B, they 
need not be independent conditioning on A if P(B/A) ≠ 1. So B must be included if the causal Markov 
condition is to be satisfied. 
33 Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993, p. 44. 
34 Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993, p. 43. 
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of the fact that that the subject is formal and precise: we can prove theorems about manipulation, 
about efficient conditioning sets for measuring the size of a causal effect, about the certainty of 
the results of the algorithms when applied to systems satisfying specific conditions, etc. But this is 
all pseudo-rationalism if we do not provide coherent characterizations of the concepts we are 
using. 
 
The trouble with the characterization of  “causal  sufficiency” arises from the fact that for Spirtes, 
Glymour and Scheines the notion of direct cause is relative to the choice of a particular variable 
set. Spohn’s talk of the set of “all the variables needed for a complete description of empirical 
reality”35, temporally ordered, avoids this; Pearl, too, because he supposes that the underlying 
system is a set of deterministic causal laws on a finite set of causally ordered variables. No-one to 
my knowledge has a good account of causal sufficiency for dense sets of effects,  for instance, for 
the kinds of systems studied by time-series analysis. As I remarked, Spirtes, Glymour and 
Scheines talk only of correct causal representations36. That not only allows them to appear to 
avoid metaphysics, as Spohn and Pearl clearly do not, but also leaves an opening for supposing 
that the underlying metaphysics is continuous. But the advantages are illusory if we cannot 
produce adequate definitions. 
 
Before proceeding to look at the list of factors that undermine the causal Markov condition, I 
should comment on one recent defense of it. Daniel Hausman and James Woodward37 offer a 
proof of the condition alternative to the proof by Pearl and Verma. Central to their discussion is a 
concept they call modularity: each separate effect under study should be manipulable without 
disturbing any other.  They claim that, given certain other conditions (such as the existence for 
each effect of a cause not in the variable set under consideration), the causal Markov condition is 
“the flip side of” modularity. This would be a good defense if it were true. For we need not agree 
with Hausman and Woodward that all causal systems must be modular; we could nevertheless 
(supposing their other conditions are met) assume the causal Markov condition wherever we 
assume modularity.  
 
The trouble is that the proof does not bear the interpretation they put on it. For given their other 
conditions, both modularity and the causal Markov condition follow separately. One is not the flip 
side of the other; both are the result of the conditions they suppose at the start. And these 
conditions are at any rate strong enough to call the Pearl and Verma proof of the causal Markov 
condition into play.38 
 
 
3b. Other reasons why factors may be dependent. 
 
 2) When two causes cooperate to produce one effect, they will be mutually dependent in a 
population homogeneous with respect to that effect. These kinds of cases are common in practice. 
                                                 
35 Spohn forthcoming, p. 11. 
36 This is my account. They do not say what they do. For instance, in their section “Axioms”, they provide 
no axioms but only definitions (of the causal minimality condition, the faithfulness condition, and the 
causal Markov condition). But I take it their claims are: every correct causal graph over a causally 
sufficient set of variables satisfies these conditions. 
37 Hausman and Woodward 1999. 
38 For a full discussion see Cartwright forthcoming b). 
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Data is hard to come by. We collect it for one reason, but need to utilize it for many others. 
Imagine for example that we have data on patients from a given hospital, where one disease, D, is 
especially prevalent. But we are interested in another condition, B. Unbeknownst to us B 
cooperates with A in the production of D, so A and B are dependent in our population (even once 
we have conditioned on all the parents of A in a causally sufficient variable set). We erroneously 
infer that A causes B in this kind of population. 
 
The problem here is not with the sample size. We can imagine that the sample is large and the 
frequencies are indicative of the “true” probabilities for the population involved. The problem for 
the causal Markov condition is with the choice of population. We all know that to study the 
relation between A and B we should not use populations like this. But how should we – properly 
– characterize populations “like this”?  
 
3) Mixing. Even if we assume the causal Markov condition for populations where the probabilities 
of the effect are fixed by the causal history, for mixed populations cooperating causes can still be 
correlated if the proportion of the effect is determined by some external factor rather than the 
causal history. Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines tell us that there are no cases of mixing for causally 
sufficient variable sets: “When a cause of membership in a sub-population is rightly regarded as 
a common cause of the variables in V, the Causal Markov Condition is not violated in a mixed 
population.”39 I think this is a bad idea: the “variables” that are the “cause of membership in a 
subpopulation” will often look nothing like variables – they don’t vary in any reasonable way and 
there is no reason to think there is a probability distribution over them; and even if we did count 
them as variables, it looks as if we would have to count them as common causes of every variable 
in V to ensure restoration of the causal Markov condition.”40  
 
4) Many quantities change in the same direction in time. There will thus be a probabilistic 
dependence between them. Social scientists solve this problem by detrending before they look for 
dependencies. Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines maintain that there is no problem to solve. They use 
their previous solution to the problem of mixing plus a bold claim: “if we consider a series in 
which variable A increases with time, then A and B will be correlated in the population formed 
from all the units-at-times, even though A and B have no causal connection. Any such combined 
population is obviously a mixture of populations given by the time values.41 
 
Like others42 I find this claim ungrounded. Moreover it seems to me to be in tension with their 
commitment to determinism – which is important to them since in deterministic systems the 
causal Markov condition is bound to be true if only we add enough into the set of parents. Their 
idea I take it is that there will be different probability distributions across the causes operating at 
each time slice, hence mixing. But consider deterministic models in physics. These I take it are 
important for Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines because these are what make many people 
sympathetic to their claim that all macroscopic processes are deterministic. Any two systems 
moving inertially will have their positions correlated, and they have exactly the same causes 
operating at each instant with the same probability distribution over them, namely – none. 
                                                 
39 Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993, p. 60, ital. orig. 
40 For details see Cartwright 1999, ch.5  and Cartwright 2000. 
41 Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993, p. 63. 
42 Cf. Berkovitz forthcoming and Hoover forthcoming, ch. 7, and Sober 1988, pp. 161-162 and 2000. 
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5) Products and by-products are mutually dependent, and when causes act purely 
probabilistically, no amount of conditioning on parents will eliminate the dependence. Perhaps 
then there isn’t any purely probabilistic causation – that would save the causal Markov condition. 
But that is a big metaphysical gamble, especially in the face of the fact that for the kind of 
variables for which Bayes nets methods are being sold, we seldom are able to formulate even a 
reasonable probabilistic model, let alone a deterministic one. We can of course stick to the 
metaphysical insistence that everything must be deterministic. Again, I think that is not only 
unwarranted, but irresponsible. But I will say no more about the matter here since I have written  
much about it elsewhere.43  
 
 
5) Analysis. 
 
Dependence could be due to causation. But there are lots of other reasons for it as well. Bayes 
nets methods stress one – the operation of common causes – and tell us how to deal with it when 
the underlying system is deterministic. The other four reasons standard in the philosophical 
literature are badly handled or made light of. And what about other reasons? Have we listed them 
all? 
 
The reasons I listed are prevalent not only in the philosophical literature. They are standard fare in 
courses on social science methodology, along with lots of other cautions about the use of 
probabilities to infer causes in even experimental or quasi-experimental contexts. And they are 
not handled so badly there. In part the failures in the philosophical discussion arise from the 
requirement that the connection, whatever it is, be tight. We look for a claim of the form: A 
causes B iff A and B are probabilistically dependent in populations satisfying X. Then X is hard 
to formulate in the kind of vocabulary we need for formal proofs and precise characterizations.  
 
But why should we think the connection is tight? As Spohn says, if it is tight there ought to be a 
reason. There is, as I have argued, a reason for the connection between probabilistic dependence 
and causality, but the very reason shows that the connection is not tight. Causes can increase the 
probability of their effects; but they need not. And for the other way around: an increase in 
probability can be due to a causal connection; but lots of other things can be responsible as well. 
 
I think we are still suffering under the presumptions of the old Hume programme. First, we don’t 
like modalities, especially strange ones.44 My breakfast cereal box says: “Shredded Wheat can 
help maintain the Health of your Heart”. In the same sense, causes can increase the probability of 
their effects. Distressed at this odd modality, we try to render this as a claim that causes will 
increase the probability of their effects, given X; then we straggle to formulate X. Second, we 
cannot get loose of the idea that causes need associations to make them legitimate. So we want 
some “if and only if” with probabilities on the right, even if we grudgingly have to use some 
causal concepts to get the right hand side filled in properly. I think we are looking at the issue 
entirely the wrong way. The connection between causes and probabilities is not like that. It is, 
                                                 
43 See Cartwright 1997, Cartwright 1999, ch. 5 and Cartwright 2000. 
44 I offer a treatment—though yet really satisfactory—of these kinds of modality in Cartwright 1999. 
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rather, like the connection between a disease and one of its symptoms. The disease can cause the 
symptom, but it need not; and the same symptom can result from a great many different diseases. 
 
This is why the philosopher’s strategy is bad. We believe there must be some “if and only if” and 
so are inclined to make light of cases that do not fit. The advice from my course on methods in the 
social sciences is better: “If you see a probabilistic dependence and are inclined to infer a causal 
connection from it, think hard about all the other possible reasons that that dependence might 
occur and eliminate them one by one. And when you are all done, remember –  your conclusion is 
no more certain than your confidence that you really have eliminated all the possible 
alternatives.” 
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